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For decades autism has been defined as a triad of deficits in social interaction,
communication, and imaginative play. Though there is now broad acknowledgment of
the neurological basis of autism, there is little attention paid to the contribution of such
neurological differences to a person’s development and functioning. Communication,
relationship, and participation require neurological systems to coordinate and synchronize
the organization and regulation of sensory information and movement. Developmental
differences in these abilities are likely to result in differences in the way a person
behaves and expresses intention and meaning. The present paper shares our emerging
awareness that people may struggle with difficulties that are not immediately evident to
an outsider. This paper explores the symptoms of sensory and movement differences
and the possible implications for autistic people. It provides a review of the history
and literature that describes the neurological basis for many of the socalled behavioral
differences that people experience. The paper emphasizes the importance of our
acknowledgment that a social interpretation of differences in behavior, relationship, and
communication can lead us far away from the lived experience of individuals with the
autism label and those who support them. We suggest alternative ways to address the
challenges faced by people with autism.
Keywords: autism, autism: sensory-movement differences, autism: sensory-motor difficulties, autism:
neurological implications, autism: movement perspective
INTRODUCTION
I was intensely preoccupied with the movement of the spinning coin
or lid and I saw nothing and heard nothing. I did it because it shut
out sound that hurt my ears. No sound intruded on my fixation. It
was like being deaf. Even a sudden noise didn’t startle me out of my
world. (Grandin, 1992a,b,c)
People with autism often move their bodies in ways that are
unfamiliar to us. Some people rock, repeatedly touch an object,
jump, and finger posture while other people come to a standstill
in a doorway, sit until cued to move or turn away when someone
beckons. As professionals trained to see these as autistic behaviors,
most of us have interpreted such movements as both volitional
and meaningless; or as communicative acts signaling avoidance
of interaction and evidence of diminished cognitive capacity; or
as some combination of these, often to be targeted for reduction.
We have taken a socially constructed interpretation of what we see
and have built a “theory” of autism.
This paper challenges the traditional definitions of autism that
give primacy to a triad of deficits in social interaction, communi-
cation, and imaginative play (Wing, 1981;DSM-IV- TRAmerican
Psychiatric Association, 2000). The approach is both widely
known and essentially unchallenged despite broad acknowledg-
ment that autism is a condition that reflects some differences in a
person’s neurology. Typically, the neurological implications have
not become part of the description. Over the past two decades,
however, researchers and self-advocates have begun to rethink
this socially defined focus. They express concern that children
and adults with the autism label may be challenged by unrec-
ognized and significant sensory and movement differences (e.g.,
(Williams, 1992; Hill and Leary, 1993; Donnellan and Leary,
1995; Bristol et al., 1996; Leary and Hill, 1996; Donnellan, 1999;
Filipek et al., 2000; Sullivan, 2002; Dhossche, 2004; Bluestone,
2005; Nayate et al., 2005; Endow, 2006; Jansiewicz et al., 2006;
Mostofsky et al., 2006; Leekam et al., 2007; Markram et al., 2007;
Tomchek and Dunn, 2007; Gernsbacher et al., 2008; Goldman
et al., 2009).
Researchers and others describe these differences using a
variety of terms such as: motor problems, sensory-integration
problems, inertia, sensory overload, apraxia, dyspraxia, echolalia,
mutism, behavior disorder, catatonia, or clumsiness. To reflect
the range and complexity of sensory perception and movement
related phenomena, we use the term “sensory and movement
differences” as it encompasses the dynamic interaction of sen-
sation and movement (Gibson, 1979; Thelen and Smith, 1994)
while acknowledging that many differences are merely part of the
richness of human diversity.
Behavior is highly interpretable. Some behaviors may be com-
municative; some may be volitional (Donnellan et al., 1984).
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Some behaviors, however, may not be intentional. Rather,
observed behaviors may be artifacts of the difficulties a per-
son may be having in organizing and regulating sensation and
movement. Still others may be subtle signals of the desire
for relationship or expressions of meaning. Therapeutic and
intervention-based approaches, designed to address perceived
and identified challenging and problematic behaviors of indi-
viduals with autism, tend to oversimplify the complex nature of
human interactions in an attempt to delineate and manipulate
variables contributing to and sustaining particular behaviors.
As we have professionalized interactions with people with
autism, we have trained professionals, parents, and others to
interpret what happens in terms of simple, binary views of
behavior (i.e., good/bad or positive/negative), and to see behav-
iors as controlled by immediate, situational antecedents, and
consequences. When we focus on these socially constructed
expectations for behavior and communication in our fast-paced,
super-technological world, we miss opportunities to know and
understand people who may experience their existence and inter-
actions in very different ways. Behaviors may not be what they
seem (Donnellan et al., 2006; Robledo et al., 2012).
Our interest in the topic of sensory and movement differ-
ences has grown from reports by many self-advocates with the
autism label and their caregivers that disturbances of sensation
and movement are a constant concern, frequently constraining
ability to communicate, relate to others and participate in life
(e.g., Barron and Barron, 1992; Strandt-Conroy, 1999; Rubin
et al., 2001; Robledo et al., 2012). Organizing and regulating sen-
sory information and movement in order to participate in social
relationships may be frustrating for people with such differences.
These differences can involve difficulties initiating and execut-
ing movements or difficulties with stopping, combining, and
switching sensation and movement including speech, thought
and emotion, (Hill and Leary, 1993; Donnellan and Leary, 1995;
Donnellan et al., 2006) making social relationships and many
other activities very challenging, even overwhelming.
Self-advocates also report that they lack sensation or feedback
from their bodies and may feel physically unaware of their facial
expressions, position in space and movements (e.g., Williams,
1996a,b, 2003; Blackman, 1999; Hale andHale, 1999). Some expe-
rience the sights and sounds of their world as being painfully
intense (Condon, 1985; Williams, 1992, 1996b; Markram et al.,
2007). Extreme emotions can cause the individual to become
stuck, unable to cease repetition of a movement. Self-confidence
and reputation often suffer when others assume a person is
repeating an action “on purpose.” Sean Barron (Barron and
Barron, 1992, p. 181) wrote: “All I wanted was to be like the other
kids my age. It felt as if I was weird and strange on the outside,
but inside I was not like that. The inside person wanted to get out
and break free of all the behaviors that I was a slave to and could
not stop.” For many people, as for Sean, simple movements can
lead to repetitions or perseveration, even when they want to stop
the movement.
Our concern here is not to discard useful information already
accumulated via a primarily socially defined approach to autism.
Nor are we interested in enhancing a deficit-based approach to
understanding autism, or in creating a new disability category. We
do not propose to specify a cause of autism or a site of lesion or
dysfunction within the central nervous system. Rather, we write to
share our emerging awareness that people may struggle with dif-
ficulties that are not immediately evident to an outsider. That is,
our experience of individuals with autism ought no longer to be
assumed the same as their experience. Individuals with the autism
label often describe experiences which are not immediately obvi-
ous to the rest of us but which may well-affect our understanding
of their behavior. These experiences frequently fit the definition
of sensory and movement differences. Sue Rubin (pers. commu-
nication, August 4, 2007) described her dilemma with intention
and action: “When you said we could stay and asked dad to do
the shopping for the Asperger’s barbeque, my body relaxed and
autism let me eat the melon.” And two other autistic adults had
the following interaction about sensory and movement differ-
ences. Judy Endow (pers. communication via Facebook, January
25, 2009) described her experiences in relation to sensory and
movement differences:
I think the fluidity of access to various places in the brain is dependent
upon neurological movement between places. I’m no scientist, but
have always been able to “see” this inside of me. Sometimes my speak-
ing is hindered, other times my thinking and sometimes my physical
movement. The hardest is when thinking is not working smoothly.
When that happens I have to line up one thought at a time, like
train cars. I like it much better when my thoughts do not have to be
methodically lined up, but are more fluid with colors coming in and
out and swirling into unique and beautiful patterns. (My thoughts
are in pictures and sometimes moving colors.)
Phil Schwarz (pers. communication via Facebook, January
25, 2009) commented on Judy’s description by using another
analogy:
I think that processing bandwidth—what Judy calls “neurological
movement between places”—is a critical factor in autism. I think
that those of us who do learn to cope develop adaptations that allow
more parsimonious use of the bandwidth available to us: love of
sameness, or of patterns, or of predictability (so that we can apply
the bandwidth we do have to “deviations” from the predicted or from
the patterns). There is a coherent autistic aesthetic sensibility that
is informed by this search for parsimony of bandwidth use, and for
titration of excesses.
This paper explores some of the implications of sensory and
movement differences in the development and experiences of
individuals with the autism label. We note, of course, that some
researchers and clinicians completely deny the possibility that
individuals with autism might experience any problems with
movement. Rimland (1993, p. 3), a psychologist long a proponent
of a biological approach to autism, wrote:
It has been widely recognized for many decades that the vast majority
of autistic persons are quite unimpaired with regard to their fin-
ger dexterity and gross motor capabilities. They have in fact often
been described as especially dexterous and coordinated. The literature
abounds with stories of young autistic children who can take apart
and reassemble small mechanical devices, build towers of blocks and
dominos higher than a normal adult can, assemble jigsaw puzzles
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and climb to dangerously high places without falling. The files of the
Autism Research Institute contain over 17,000 questionnaires com-
pleted by the parents of autistic children. Finger dexterity is one
question we’ve asked about since 1965. Most parents indicate that
their children are average or above in the use of their hands. The idea
that autism is, or typically involves, a “movement disorder” is simply
ludicrous.
Likewise, Mulick et al. (1993), behavioral psychologists,
stated unequivocally that clinical experience argues against any
motor/movement difficulties, particularly voluntary control of
movement in apraxia:
Scientific evidence for developmental apraxia in autism is lack-
ing. Autistic youngsters are often characterized by better-developed
[emphasis in original] motor skills than verbal skills, even real non-
verbal problem solving talent . . . There is no research evidence at
all to support the position that people with autism experience such
global problems. The usual clinical finding, familiar to any psycholo-
gist who routinely works in this area, is that motor impairment and
delay is much less common than communication disorder and delay.
(p. 274)
The common approach in autism pays scant attention to pos-
sible somatic difficulties resulting from neurological differences.
Perhaps, this is a function of the dominance of psychology and
psychiatry for the first 50 or more years of the autism story.
Yet, some psychologists and psychiatrists did report movement
differences and even catatonic symptoms in autism long before
Rimland or Mulick et al. and others denied the existence of such
evidence (e.g., Damasio and Maurer, 1978; Wing and Attwood,
1987). More recently, many researchers have noted the presence
of impairments in basic motor skills: gait, posture, balance, speed,
coordination (e.g., Ghaziuddin and Butler, 1998; Noterdaeme
et al., 2002; Jansiewicz et al., 2006; Rinehart et al., 2006; Green
et al., 2009; Mostofsky et al., 2009; Fournier et al., 2010). Fournier
et al. (2010) in their meta-analysis of claims of motor differences
in autism since 1981 write:
Based on our synthesis of the existing literature and comprehensive
meta-analytic techniques, we conclude that ASD is associated with
significant and widespread alterations in motor performance. Recent
neuroanatomical and neurophysiologic studies implicate cortical and
subcortical areas including the motor context, supplementary motor
deficits in motor planning, sensorimotor integration, and motor exe-
cution . . .. Our current findings serve as the basis for tentatively
arguing that motor deficits are a potential core feature of ASD, and
that treatment of ASD should consider including interventions aimed
at improving motor performances involved with motor coordination
(i.e., gait and balance, arm functions, and movement planning).
(p. 1237)
Many neuroscientists now are stressing the significance and
implications of motor and sensory difficulties in the develop-
ment of children with autism. For example, Sutera et al. (2007)
looked at 4-years-old who had been diagnosed at age two and
received early intervention of various amounts and types. Of
particular interest were the children who “lost” the diagnosis
of autism by age four. Sutera et al., found that the best pre-
dictor of this outcome for very young children with autism is
motor skill at age two. Mostofsky et al. (2007) noted this finding
and addressed concerns about the exclusion of motor prob-
lems from the “core” features of autism in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR; American
Psychiatric Association, 2000) “. . . despite [an] abundance of lit-
erature suggesting otherwise.” A growing number of researchers
and clinicians in a broad range of disciplines continue to stress
the importance of studying motor function in autism because, as
Rogers et al. (2003) reported, “Simple imitation skills were differ-
entially impaired in young children with autism, and lack of social
cooperation did not account for their poor performance p. 763).
Mostofsky et al. (2007) reported, “Motor signs are highly quan-
tifiable and reproducible and can serve as markers for deficits in
parallel systems important for socialization and communication”
(p. 2117). For example, children with autism are often described
as lacking reciprocity. Esther Thelen (1941–2004), an innovative
researcher of infant development, upon reviewing the issue of
motor development in autism, asked: “How can you talk about
“reciprocity” or lack thereof as a psychological phenomenon if
the child has motor problems?” (pers. communication, 1997). In
the course of development, if individuals move and respond in
idiosyncratic ways from infancy, they will experience all interac-
tions within a unique frame that most certainly differs from that
which is called typical. The cumulative effect of such interactions
will be one in which all aspects of relationships, including how
to establish and maintain them, may be markedly skewed from
the broader cultural consensus and expected rules of how rela-
tionships work 1. Our experience and self-advocate reports have
taught us that individuals with autism often are aware of their
idiosyncrasies, may not be able to control them but do want com-
munication, participation and relationship. In order to make this
possible, we need to acknowledge and accommodate the differ-
ences so that communication, relationship, and participation can
happen.
DYNAMIC INTERACTIONS OF NERVOUS SYSTEM, BODY,
AND ENVIRONMENT
As we have noted elsewhere (Donnellan et al., 2006), the writings
of many authors interested in movement describe a unity of per-
ception, action, emotion, and thought. Feldenkrais, a physicist,
martial artist, and renowned movement innovator noted: “Our
self-image consists of four components that are involved in every
action: movement, sensation, feeling and thought” (Feldenkrais,
1972, p. 10). Likewise, in his fascinating book, Awakenings,
Sacks (1990) wrote of the self-reports of his patients with
post-encephalitic Parkinson’s disease who temporarily “awoke”
through the use of the drug L-Dopa. They all had been sick from
the same disease, Encephalitis lethargica. The area of damage in
their brains from the disease was clearly established. Nonetheless,
each developed his or her own personalized version of move-
ment disorder and many of their difficulties were unknown to
the medical staff until they were able to speak. The variety of
manifestations of symptoms encompassed difficulties with many
1For reviews of the complex and dynamic interrelationship of movement, per-
ception, relationship, and cognitive development, see: (Gibson, 1979; Thelen
and Smith, 1994; Stern, 2000).
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hidden aspects of human experience: perception of the passing of
time, interest in normal activities, fatigue, memory, and recurring
thoughts. These complex phenomenon related to organization
and regulation, now commonly recognized in other neurological
disorders, require us to think about movement disorders beyond
observable motor difficulties.
Thelen incorporated dynamic systems models in her innova-
tive research on movement in child development (Thelen and
Smith, 1994; Thelen, 1995). In this view, perceptions, movement,
thoughts, and emotions can be linked together by having coin-
cidentally (and possibly routinely) co-occurred. Experience may
selectively reinforce them as a bundle. They can be unbundled
or softly assembled as required by the context. The individual is
always operating within an environment or context and, as the
context changes, systems scan, adjust, and shift as necessary to
meet new demands. These contextual shifts play a vital role in
movement. Context comes together with in such a way as to allow
the movement to emerge or not; a movement and, indeed, the
person or persons are part of the context (Thelen and Smith,
1994). As Bateson (1972) told us years ago, context is far more
than what is left when we take out the part we wish to study.
No single component is causal in determining the movement.
As these are dynamic systems, the components are the context
that determine the product. Thelen and Smith (1994, p. 73) fur-
ther explained that “. . . even behaviors that look wired in or
program-driven can be seen as dynamically emergent: behavior is
assembled by the nature of the task, and opportunistically recruits
the necessary and available organic components (which them-
selves have dynamic histories) and environmental support.” These
may be actions, thoughts, words, memories, or sense experiences.
Recall Proust, where the taste of a cookie released the hundreds of
pages of Remembrance of Things Past.
Thelen’s approach offers new ways to understand the inconsis-
tent abilities and disabilities of individuals with the autism label.
Speech is an example of dynamic behavior. Speech is not lost
or gained; it emerges when all necessary components, recruited
and appropriately regulated and organized, allow its produc-
tion. Stress often makes speech difficult or even impossible. And
stress need not be negative; excitement may also cause difficul-
ties. Paradoxically, for some people with sensory and movement
differences, stress also may help produce speech. While present-
ing with the authors at an Autism Society of America conference
in July 1996, Arthur Shawlow, Nobel laureate and father of an
adult son with autism, reported that his son could say a complete,
and original, context-appropriate sentence about once every 8–10
years. He asked the audience, how many parents had similar
experiences and at least 18 sets of parents raised their hands.
They met and compared notes. Most of the labeled children of
these individuals were able to speak under extreme, often neg-
ative, circumstances. Some had only spoken once or twice in a
lifetime.
Reports of this kind are not unusual in the sensory and move-
ment differences literature, among the autism community or our
own 100+ years of combined experience with children and adults
with the autism label. More common are phenomena such as
echolalia, mutism, speech uttered only under unique circum-
stances, e.g., speaking what they have written. In the dynamic
system model the notion of emergence begins to give us a way
to understand and perhaps support people with these differ-
ences. Robledo et al. (2012) report on 40 h of interviews with
adults with autism who experienced such symptoms and more.
The interviews had to be adjusted to the specialized needs of the
interviewees. Several could only answer written questions sent in
advance; others if they were on the phone and in a warm bath.
Likewise, the autistic people in Robledo and Donnellan (2008)
each had personalized supports to enable them to participate
in the interviews. We refer to these specialized arrangements as
accommodations after Luria (1932) and Sacks (1990). We define
accommodations as adjustments or adaptations of an interac-
tion, a task, situation, or the environment that assist a person to
temporarily get around difficulties organizing and regulating sen-
sory information ormovement (for example, see Donnellan et al.,
2006).
LEARNING FROM NEUROLOGICAL SYMPTOMS IN OTHER
SENSORY ANDMOVEMENT DISORDERS
In our review of the history of movement differences we
found early descriptions of catatonia in the work of Kahlbaum
(1874/1973) which seemed startlingly familiar (see Hill and Leary,
1993; Donnellan and Leary, 1995; Starkstein et al., 1995; Leary
and Hill, 1996). In the nineteenth century there was no clear dis-
tinction between neurological and psychiatric symptoms. As the
two fields diverged in the early twentieth century, however, some
conditions gravitated into one or the other. Catatonia is presently
defined as a characteristic of certain kinds of schizophrenia,
though many have argued over the years for a more neurological
view of the disorder (Abrams andTaylor, 1976; Rogers, 1992). The
discussion of where to place catatonia and catatonic symptoms is
once again topical because of the plan to update the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of the APA. Some, in fact, are arguing
for the inclusion of catatonia as a separate diagnostic category
or under “movement disturbances” (Taylor and Fink, 2003; Fink
and Taylor, 2006; Penland et al., 2006; Caroff and Ungvari, 2007).
Irrespective of that discussion, it is useful to look at the symp-
toms described by Kahlbaum and other early and recent authors
as these may illuminate the symptoms seen in individuals with
autism and other developmental disabilities.
In Table 1, the characteristic features and symptoms on the left
side of the table are borrowed from descriptors specific to several
kinds of movement disorders (Kahlbaum, 1874/1973; Fink and
Taylor, 2003, 2006; Taylor et al., 2005; Caroff and Ungvari, 2007;
The Movement Disorder Society, 2010). The list of movement
disorders symptoms is not in any particular order or hierarchy;
rather, symptoms are listed randomly as taken from the above lit-
erature sources. The intent here is to show the scope of symptoms
by feature that may account for certain behaviors seen in autism.
Examples of behaviors listed on the right side of Table 1 appear
there because they have been discussed in a previously published
review of the autism literature andmovement disturbances (Leary
and Hill, 1996). The majority of these have also been documented
and observed throughout many years of clinical practice with a
large number of individuals with autism across the life span.
Leary and Hill (1996) analyzed the literature on symp-
toms associated with established movement disorders and those
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Table 1 | Characteristic features of substantial movement disturbances and evidence of possible overlap of symptoms in autism.
Movement disturbance feature Symptoms evidence in autism
Repetitive motor actions e.g., Tapping, touching, grimacing
Rhythmical, cyclical movements e.g., Rocking, shrugging, squinting, pouting
Lack of initiation Requires prompts and cues to perform
Difficulty imitating others’ actions Both immediate and delayed motor imitation difficulties
Echophenomena Mimesis; elaborate copying of others’ actions—verbal and/or motor
Immobility Remains fixed and inert in position and posture for extended time periods
Withdrawal Isolates self away from focal activity and others
Grimacing Facial/oral-motor movements
Stereotypies Repetitive movements of the hands, limbs, extemities, and whole body
Aversion Of eye gaze and attention to others
Negativism Oppositional actions elicited with passive movement and overall behavior
Automatic obedience; suggestibility Extreme compliance in response to verbal suggestion and environmental cues
Rigidity Muscles rigid to passive movement
Bradykinesia Slowness of movements, feebleness
Tremor Essential, intentional, rest, postural, etc.
Forced grasping Of another’s hands, wrists, etc., or items in the environment
Akinesia Marked absence of action and movements
Akathisia Motor restlessness, moves about but not goal-directed
Ataxia Loss of coordination in motor action execution
Perseveration Motor or other repeated behavior after being elicited an initial stimulus
Ambitendency Appears “stuck” in indecisive, hesitant movements
Tics Motor and/or verbal
Obstruction; blocking Incomplete movement toward a goal—“gets stuck” en route to goal
Difficulty with stopping, cessation of movement Will continue movements unless redirected or stopped by an external means
Mannerisms Uses intact and entire motor action sequences out of context, e.g., salutes
Waxy flexibility Automatic ease and compliance with assuming unusual postures for extended time
Ballismus Violent, rapid and apparently involuntary actions and movements
Choreiform movements Rapid and apparently involuntary traveling and “dancing” ripples of movement
Catalepsy (posturing) Maintains seemingly uncomfortable and imposed postures for extended time
Atheloid movements Slow, writhing movements and actions
Spasms Muscular spasms of varying durations affecting muscle groups
Dystonias Sustained torsion due to muscle contractions in varied muscle groups
Impulsivity Actions and movements triggered suddenly
Self-injury, mutilation Disturbing and persistent attempts to inflict pain on self
Excitement; frenzy Marked episodes of extreme amounts of activity for extended time
Aggression, destruction Unprecipitated violent actions directed to others and the environment
Stupor Prolonged period of total immobility, lack of responsiveness and mutism
Rituals Object-related actions on objects as part of a routine, repeated event
Motility changes e.g., Toe walking, skipping, hopping
Changes in speech behavior e.g., Mutism; question repetition; echolalia; verbigeration; logorrhoea; foreign accent; changes in
prosody; difficulty modulating volume
Automatic changes Changes in typical autonomic functions, e.g., heart rate, perspiration, breathing, core body
temperature
associated with autism. The greatest difference among these dis-
abilities was the interpretation of the symptoms. In Tourette
syndrome, Parkinson’s disorder and catatonia, there was a neu-
rological interpretation of symptoms. A social rather than a
neurological interpretation was applied if the person had a label
of autism. That which is called a “tic” in a person with Tourette
syndrome is most often assumed to be a “behavior” (and often
a conscious choice) in a person with autism. For symptoms
interpreted through a neurological lens, individuals tend to be
appropriately supported. In autism, symptoms are viewed fre-
quently as behaviors to be reduced or eliminated often with a
negative intervention and results. Table 2 illustrates descriptions
given to similar behaviors dependent on a person’s diagnosis.
The sensory and movement differences reported by and
observed in individuals with autism may have a significant
impact on their and our ability to relate and participate in social
interactions. A neurological view of symptoms possibly affect-
ing autistic individuals will help us to understand further the
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Table 2 | Differences in descriptions of behavior.
Neurological terms Social interpretation of behavior
Akinesia Non-compliance, social indifference
Festination Behavior excess, careless
Bradykinesia Lazy, slow
Bradyphrenia Mental retardation
Tics Aberrant behavior
Obsessional/adventitious behaviors Autistic behavior, “stims”
nature of differences experienced by these individuals. While the
psychological impact is very real as experienced first-hand by
participants in such interactions, it is useful to suspend social
interpretations of the symptoms so as not to mistakenly ascribe
intent and volition to individuals whose behaviormay be contrary
to what really is intended and able to be communicated.
Detailed personal descriptions of movement and sensory dif-
ferences found in other disabilities have given us some additional
insight as to what it may be like for a person to deal with vari-
ous symptoms such as compelling impulses, a loss of conscious
control, lack of initiation, akinetic moments, and unusual ways of
being in the world (e.g., McGoon, 1994). Frequently, the person
has both the challenge of the movement difference and burden
of blame and misunderstanding. In the Robledo et al. (2012)
research it was often necessary to use vignettes from people
with other sensory movement differences to enable the autistic
interviewees to recognize their own experience. Most expressed
gratitude for the opportunity to learn about movement differ-
ences as they often had blamed themselves for their behavior and
all thought they were alone in having these difficulties.
IMPLICATIONS OF SENSORY ANDMOVEMENT
DIFFERENCES FOR UNDERSTANDING PEOPLE LABELED
WITH AUTISM
A different kind of science.
Woe to that science whose methods are developed in advance of its
problems, so that the experimenter can see only those phases of a
problem for which a method is already at hand.
(Murphy, 1939, p. 114)
We have stressed the neurological aspects of what are com-
monly thought of as autistic characteristics and behavior prob-
lems. We do not intend, however, to either suggest a whole new
category of disabilities in autism or to eliminate the psychologi-
cal aspects. The issues here are similar to the challenges faced by
those interested in Tourette syndrome. The syndrome was elu-
cidated before the fields of neurology and psychiatry diverged
(Gilles de la Tourette, 1885). For many years, psychiatry domi-
nated the discussion and the treatment. In the past few decades,
there has been a far greater emphasis on the neurology of the
disorder. Yet, it is clear that it is not possible to separate the neuro-
logical from the psychological in a living human being. As Sacks
(1989) suggests, there is need for a different kind of science that
views the individual as a whole person, mind and body. This shift
has begun in Tourette syndrome. In addition, dynamic systems
models of development suggest an emphasis on the unique his-
tory and the critical importance of context on the manifestations
of the symptoms. Perhaps the present emphasis on discrete “autis-
tic” behaviors tied to specific interventions should be seen in
terms of more circumscribed value and utility.
DEVELOPMENTAL vs. ACQUIRED SYMPTOMS
In addition to the personalized nature of the characteristics
and the dynamic nature of the manifestations of a movement
difference mentioned above, it is impossible to overemphasize
the importance of the developmental aspects of movement dif-
ferences in autism vs. adult acquired disorders. For example,
bradykinesia, or very slow movements, might have a wide range
of effects on adults with acquired disorders such as Parkinsonism.
In an infant or a toddler, the possible effects of slow responding
or delayed initiating would surely have an effect on the entire tra-
jectory of development even if the difference were intermittent
or barely perceptible to the parents or professionals. Of course,
we are not suggesting that these autistic people have Parkinson’s
syndrome; rather that they report sensory and movement dif-
ferences which are not obvious to their caregivers, particularly
parents of young children. Yet, the potential changes to the “dance
of relationships” (Stern, 2000) alone would be worthy of many
dissertations in child development. But the complexity of the task
ought not deter us from attempting such inquiry because it could
have enormous implications for our understanding of human
development and diversity.
INTERPRETATION OF SYMPTOMS AS VOLITIONAL
Many of us have accepted without question the implicit mes-
sage that unusual movements presented by people with autism
are always volitional and often pleasurable. Sensory and move-
ment difference symptoms in autism are consistently interpreted
by others as autistic behaviors. Neurological symptoms such as
sudden, loud vocalizations; being in constant motion; extreme
response to minor changes; unusual mannerisms and gait; and
“unmotivated” laughter are examples of behaviors commonly
thought to be performed “on purpose” and targeted for behav-
ioral intervention. A social interpretation of these symptoms
often leaves people with the assumption that they occur as a mat-
ter of choice, apathy, or learned behavior. Aggression during an
episode of catatonic frenzy is viewed differently if the neurolog-
ical aspects of the person’s experience are considered. Typically,
reprimands or contingent praise would not be used to change a
recognized neurological symptom. As noted, the non-volitional
aspects of behavior are rarely considered for people with autism.
For example, the authors have all too often heard criticism and
disparaging descriptions such as lazy or non-compliant applied to
a person with autism who is in a non-responsive state. Frequently,
the difficulty is related to stress, even the stress of excitement. An
all too typical example is staff or family reporting that the child
or adult refused to get out of the car or van to go to a place; he
or she seems to like. Intervention or support that is based on
our social interpretations of symptoms may not always be helpful.
Returning the non-compliant person to home, school, or program
usually results in additional trouble. We need a clearer under-
standing of people’s experiences if we are to provide appropriate
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care and support that boosts self-confidence and is the product
of collaboration rather than control. Donnellan et al. (2006) offer
many suggestions for accommodations that may help people with
autism deal with these situations.
INTERPRETATION OF SYMPTOMS AS MEANINGLESS
Our assumptions about a person’s intention or meaning directly
influence the way we respond moment to moment, the rela-
tionships we form and the support we give to people. When
we label aspects of a person’s behavior as meaningless, we may
miss opportunities to extend learning and develop our relation-
ships. Echolalia serves as well as an illustration. In the early years
of behavioral intervention for people with autism (e.g., 1960–
1980), professionals assessing a child’s communication abilities
were trained to assume that echolalia was the “meaningless repeti-
tion of a word or word group just spoken by another person” (Fay,
1969, p. 39), a non-functional, undesirable and “sick” behavior of
autism (Lovaas, 1966; Lovaas et al., 1974), and a communication
disorder in itself to be extinguished through behavior modifica-
tion (Lovaas, 1977). The fine and detailed work of researchers
such as Baltaxe and Simmons (1977), Prizant andDuchan (1981),
and Prizant and Rydell (1984) began to influence our assump-
tions about the intentions of autistic speakers. Many people
now understand that echolalia is neither always meaningless nor
always meaningful. Although sometimes not intentional, many
who lack other strategies for communicating may use echolalia
intentionally to maintain relationships, improve their compre-
hension of spoken language and to express meaning (see Kanner,
1946). Acknowledgment of a person’s efforts to accommodate,
improvise, and create meaning is a cause for celebration and an
opportunity to improve communication and boost self-esteem.
INTERPRETATION OF SYMPTOMS AS “NOT INTERESTED” IN
RELATING OR COMMUNICATING
People with autism often communicate, behave and participate
in unique, very personal, perhaps idiosyncratic ways, that require
their partners to be more flexible and open than usual in inter-
preting meaning and intention. Differences in the way people are
able to use their bodies and focus their attention lead many to
assume that a person does not care to participate or communi-
cate and does not desire relationships. These assumptions affect
our expectations, the waywe speak with them and the educational
and social opportunities we offer to them. Under the “criterion of
the least dangerous assumption” (Donnellan, 1984) it is safest to
assume that relationships are critical to human beings for learn-
ing and development even if, and perhaps especially if, they have
difficulties in these areas (Fogel, 1993; Robledo and Donnellan,
2008).
THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF RELATIONSHIP IN
LEARNING AND DEVELOPMENT
The past 40 years have witnessed the growth of a body of knowl-
edge, approaches, and intervention methodologies designed to
address the needs of individuals with autism. Often the kinds of
intervention strategies at our disposal are based on ideas and the-
ories that conflict with each other. The content of interventions
may be highly prescriptive or more loosely defined. Research can
be cited in support of the efficacy of any kind of approach for at
least some individuals in some situations. We struggle as well as
to explain and describe that quality within any intervention that
works and leads to growth and development between the partners
involved. Perhaps, the essential factor underlying any successful
intervention has been overlooked or at least not credited in the
research. We propose, along with a growing number of investiga-
tors, that the undefined element is the presence and nature of the
relationship between persons in any interaction (Maurer, 1993;
Hill and Leary, 2009).
The role of relationship in learning is the centerpiece of
socio-cultural psychology. While most of us believe that learn-
ing is enhanced by a facilitative relationship with a more mature
thinker, western psychology has only recently directed attention
to the nature of that relationship. Lev Vygotsky (1896–1934) was
a Russian psychologist whose work described and defined the
role of relationship in human development. His work empha-
sized the notion that cognitive and specific skill development is the
result of internalizing interactions with others within a relation-
ship (Bedrova and Leong, 1996). Ylvisker and Feeney (1998) have
translated Vygotskian theory into a supportmodel that focuses on
apprenticeship and collaboration between the person and another
with more expertise in the areas where support is needed. The
“tutor” provides collaborative mediation that is fine-tuned to
the learner’s changing needs for support to enable participation
in meaningful, project-oriented work: “The roots of cognitive,
executive and communication functions, as well as behavioral
self-regulation, are everyday social interaction routines” (Ylvisker
and Feeney, 1998, p. 15–16). In the socio-cultural models of
development, relationship with others serves as the springboard
for learning. Learning happens within a social context, within a
dialogue with others. We acquire cognitive skills, knowledge and
behavior regulation, not simply through memorization of facts or
actions, but through our interactions in the social world where
this knowledge has function and meaning.
INCONSISTENCY IN ABILITIES
People report sensory and movement inconsistencies such as:
fluctuations in speed and clarity of sensory perception; unreli-
able ability to maintain or release body postures; delays in speed
and accuracy of movement and speech; unpredictable changes
in muscle tone; and unwanted vocal, verbal, and physical tics
and extraneous non-functional movement (e.g., Mirenda and
Donnellan, 1986; Williams, 1996a; Harp, 2008; Robledo et al.,
2012). A sensory andmovement difference is characterized by this
inconsistency, causing stress for the most common of movements
(Baggs, 2007). A person struggling with these performance char-
acteristics may not be able to predict, plan for or sustain effective
participation. For example, a person with a 14-s delay in her abil-
ity to respond to others (e.g., Mirenda and Donnellan, 1986) is
likely to be misinterpreted and misunderstood and unlikely to
be offered time to respond. This is illustrated by Figure 1, Harp
(2008) on her blog Asperger’s Square 8 (used with permission).
SUPPORTING SELF-ESTEEM
Humans carry inside themselves an image that includes reasons
for and the possibility of change. We need to know that we are
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FIGURE 1 | Square Talk. Harp (2008), reprinted with permission.
OK just as we are, even though there are things we may want to
learn or to do better.
A current trend in early intervention for young children with
autism is to provide guidance in massive quantities (e.g., 40 h
a week of one-to-one instruction). This guidance is naturally
accompanied by frequent corrections and redirection. Given the
intensity of this intervention, special care is needed to promote
children’s self-esteem at any age.
Equally important is the need for positive, optimistic, respect-
ful support for adults with autism. The paucity of quality pro-
grams, diminished opportunity for interesting lives, effects of
medication and chemical restraint are just a few of the addi-
tional burdens on these individuals and their families. Issues of
collaboration, personalization, and comfort are also essential for
children and particularly pressing for the adult population with
the autism label. McGinnity and Negri (2005) offer helpful sug-
gestions on how students and staff can learn to be more sensitive
to the differences in those on the autism spectrum.
COLLABORATION, PERSONALIZATION, AND COMFORT
The growth of the autism industry over the past two decades has
spawned no end of books, interventions, programs and products.
Yet, the diagnosis of autism is not prescriptive of the type of sup-
ports needed for assisting any particular person to participate,
relate, and communicate. Supports for people with autism should
be personalized, reflect the respect and dignity due to all people
and address the challenges with which people struggle to organize
and regulate themselves in response to the sensory environment
and their movement differences. Appropriate supports require a
deep and local knowledge of the individual. This can be gained
from those who know and appreciate them, but often such infor-
mation is not available. Then it is even more essential to spend
significant time with the person in a variety of activities and set-
tings and with people who respect and admire him or her. We
need to learn to listen with all of our senses and compassion
(e.g., Lovett, 1996; Savarese, 2007) and to “presume competence”
(Biklen and Cardinal, 1997) in all interactions. We do not put
people in jeopardy by overestimating their experience. We do
look for competence instead of deficits and talk to people in age-
appropriate ways. And we model such interactions for all those
who are, or may become, willing to know them better.
Moreover, we need to remember that in our journey of change,
we all need allies who will collaborate with us to find the most
comfortable and effective ways for us to learn to participate in
our families, with our friends and as contributing members of
our communities (Schwarz, 2004; Robledo and Donnellan, 2008).
This is particularly critical for those persons who are challenged
by the movement differences that often make such comfort tem-
porary, personhood elusive, and collaboration a mystery. There
is much to be learned from self-advocates with autism as well as
from individuals who share some of the symptoms of movement
differences such as Tourette syndrome, Parkinson’s disorder and
from their supporters (e.g., Williams, 1992; McGoon, 1994). For
example, individuals with Tourette syndrome have taught us that
calling attention to a behavior might make it much more difficult
for a person to inhibit that behavior. It is roughly analogous
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to telling a stutterer not to stutter. Anyone familiar with class-
rooms and programs that have people with autism will recognize
the value of that cautionary comment.
CONCLUSION
When I was growing up, speaking was so frustrating. I could see the
words in my brain, but then I realized that making my mouth move
would get those letters to come alive, they died as soon as they were
born.Whatmademe feel angry was to know that I knew exactly what
I was to say and my brain was retreating in defeat . . .
(Burke, 2005, p. 250)
Jamie Burke is a college student who now is able to speak
the words he types with two fingers on his Augmentative and
Alternative Communication (AAC) device. We have proposed
that many other individuals with the autism label may be chal-
lenged by sensory movement differences in starting, stopping,
executing, combining, and/or switching actions, thoughts, emo-
tions and speech. These symptoms have been described in the
literature for many years but generally not integrated into our
descriptions or understanding of autistic behaviors.
Sensory and movement differences often escape the notice of
those of us who do not typically experience them but have been
well-described by autistic self-advocates and persons interested
in individuals with autism and other disability labels. Ignoring
these differences (or redefining them as autistic behaviors to be
controlled) has made life unnecessarily more difficult for indi-
viduals with autism and those who care about and for them.
Many of the assumptive errors we have made are based on our
own social history. In the absence of clarity about the nature of
these movement differences, we will continue to be forced into the
default position of seeing all unfamiliar behaviors as intentional,
deliberate evidence of intellectual impairments and even pleasur-
able. We have not proposed another list of deficits but a greater
understanding of the complexity of what we call autistic behaviors
and the necessity to rethink our assumptions about them. The
task is not going to be easy. Such sensory movement differences
are manifest in autism and many other disorders in strikingly
unique, personalized and dynamic ways that test present research
strategies that rely heavily on a positivist-reductionist philoso-
phy. Yet, some of the brightest scientific lights of the twentieth
century reminded us that the best way to approach objectivity
in science is to view the phenomenon from as many perspec-
tives as possible (Luria, 1932; Edelman, 1992; Arthur Schawlow,
pers. communication, 1996). As Einstein shared: “Not everything
that counts can be counted and not everything that is counted,
counts” (Einstein, 2004 as quoted in Cunningham and Scott,
2004, p. 208).
There is a long, continual path of misunderstanding in the
field of autism. People have been thought of, and referred to,
as “non-persons,” “behavior problems,” and “sub-normal” in
every imaginable way. If they cannot speak, we assume they
have little to say and offer only the most limited of communi-
cation options. Irrespective of the precision and intensity of our
interventions, more often than not they experience isolation, seg-
regation, homogeneous grouping, loneliness, pain, and boredom
as part of their customary care across the life span. Often their
sensory and movement differences contribute to such outcomes
as these leave the rest of us unaware of the true nature of their
challenges.
Any view of autism at this time needs to reflect the experience
of self-advocates with autism and others who describe sensory
andmovement differences, as well as the latest in the neuroscience
and child development literature. We need a research agenda that
focuses on understanding and supporting autistic people and oth-
ers in more respectful, personalized, and successful ways. It is the
least dangerous assumption (Donnellan, 1984) to see all as full
human beings who may have formidable and unfamiliar chal-
lenges to overcome and who, of course, desire social interaction,
communication and participation.
Too often autistic children are raised to believe they are bro-
ken and need to be fixed. Adults with autism too often live lives
of isolation and poverty. Understanding people’s experiences may
lead to acceptance, accommodation and appropriate support. To
continue down the same paths, well-worn for 65 years, when all
these data impel us to rethink our assumptions and broaden our
path is unthinkable.
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